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NOTES
A DILEMMA IN PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS: SCHOOL BOARD AUTHORITY V.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF STUDENTS TO WEAR LONG HAm
Whether public high school authorities are within the bounds
of the Constitution in promulgating regulations governing the
length of hair worn by male students' is a question which has
given rise to a multitude of lawsuits in federal courts.2 At first
glance, one might label this a trivial problem; however, a closer
examination will reveal that it is indeed one of considerable
magnitude.8 Not only does it have broad constitutional rami-
fications, 4 but the federal appellate courts have become sharply
divided on the issue.5 Due to this conflict, it seems inevitable
that the Supreme Court will eventually grant certiorari6 and
rule on the constitutionality of such restrictions on the personal
1. "Although the regulations differ in language, they essentially require
that the hair should not hang below the collar line in the back, the ears
on the side, or the eyebrows in front." Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 259
(10th Cir. 1971).
2. "Regulations of hair styles of male students in state public schools
is becoming a matter of concern to federal courts if one is to judge by
the ever increasing litigation on the subject or by the days of court time
expended, and the lengthy briefs presented. . . ." Id.
8. Justice Douglas, dissenting from a denial of certiorari in Freeman v.
Flake, 405 U.S. 72 (1972), stated that: "I can conceive of no more com-
pelling reason to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction than a conflict of
such magnitude, on an issue of importance bearing on First Amendment
and Ninth Amendment rights."
4. This problem may not only produce resounding repercussions in the
area of school discipline itself, but should cause a re-evaluation of state
authority and actions which encroach upon personal liberties and invade
the private lives of our citizens.
5. Hair regulations have been invalid in the following circuits: First
Circuit, Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Third Circuit,
Stull v. School Board, 459 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972); Fourth Circuit, Massie v.
Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Seventh Circuit, Crews v. Cloncs, 432
F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Eighth Circuit, Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069
(8th Cir. 1971); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
Those circuits ruling in favor of the regulations include: Fifth Circuit,
Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972); Sixth Circuit, Jackson v.
Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970); Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444 (6th
Cir. 1971); Ninth Circuit, King v. Saddleback Jr. College School Dist., 445
F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971); Tenth Circuit, Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258
(10th Cir. 1971).
6. Thus far the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in six cases: Free-
man v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 71 (1972);
Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972); Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); Ferrell v. Dallas I.S.D., 392
F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
7. Judge Wisdom, dissenting in Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 619 n.1
(5th Cir. 1972), stated that "'the denial of a writ of certiorari imports no
expression of opinion upon the merits of the case ... ' United States v.
[697]
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liberties of students. Therefore, it becomes important to analyze
the decisions of the federal circuits in order to gain an insight
into future litigation.
It is evident from the opinions of the federal circuits that
the controversy can be reduced to one basic issue-whether
there is a "fundamental"8 right to wear one's hair at the length
he chooses while attending public high school. To decide whether
the court has the power to hear these cases, or, having asserted
jurisdiction, to determine whether such a regulation is arbitrary
or reasonable, the answer to this question is of primary im-
portance.
The initial inquiry in the hair length cases concerns the
power of the federal courts to adjudicate this issue. The Tenth
Circuit has ruled that it does not "directly and sharply implicate
basic constitutional values ..... ,,, and thus is "not cognizable in
the federal courts. . ". ..10 Taking a similar position, the Fifth
Circuit has concluded that such complaints can be immediately
dismissed "for failure to state a claim for which relief can be
granted."" Finding no "fundamental" right involved, these courts
Carver, [260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923)] .... It is particularly fitting to recall this
maxim when 'It]he federal courts are in conduct [sic] and the decisions in
disarray,' as they are in their treatment of the problem before us today.
The Supreme Court is responsible for ensuring that constitutional rights
are uniform throughout this nation; it is hard to believe that the Court will
close its eyes eternally to the disparate recognition now being given the
constitutional rights of students who quite fortuitously inhabit different
judicial circuits."
8. The Supreme Court has traditionally stated that the fourteenth amend-
ment incorporates "the principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamentally." Snyder v. Mas-
sachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). In dissenting from the majority's ruling
in Karr, 460 F.2d 609, 619 (5th Cir. 1972), Judge Wisdom stated that his
"differences with the Court's understanding of 'fundamental' rights are
differences of legal attitude and philosophy"; quoting Judge Learned Hand
who defined "fundamental" as a word "whose office usually, though quite
innocently is to disguise what [judges] are doing and impute to it a deriva-
tion far more impressive than their personal references, which are all that
in fact lie behind the decision." L. Hand, The Bill of Rights 70 (1958). From
this language it becomes apparent that what is a "fundamental" right defies
precise definition.
9. Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 262 (10th Cir. 1971), quoting fron
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
10. 448 F.2d at 262.
11. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 618 (5th Cir. 1972). In this case, the
Fifth Circuit adopted a per se rule that hair regulations are constitutional.
The court, however, noted that if the regulations are "wholly arbitrary"
or enforced in a discriminatory manner, the rule of per se validity would
not apply. This language makes it unclear exactly what the effect of the
Court's decision will be. In light of the fact that the court's rule will be
applied without evldentiary hearings, it is submitted that it will be impos-
1973] NOTES
have decided that this matter is best left to the wisdom and dis-
cretion of public school authorities,12 rather than the federal
judiciary. 13
The majority of the federal circuits have not denied peti-
tioners a forum for such litigation and have determined that
hair regulations are properly reviewable in the federal courts.14
However, while asserting jurisdiction in such cases, the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits 15 have joined the Fifth and Tenth16 in ruling
that there is no "fundamental" right to wear one's hair at the
length he chooses while attending public high school. On the
sible to determine if a given regulation under the circumstances is "wholly
arbitrary" or discriminatory. Thus the rule would appear both confusing
in terms of future litigation and contradictory to the court's position that
the federal courts are not faced with a justiciable issue giving them juris-
diction. These pleadings do raise questions of constitutional dimension and
the determination of whether a given regulation is "arbitrary" can only
be made by a consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case.
The court's adoption of a per se rule of validity would appear to be "arbi-
trary" In itself.
12. Justice Black, acting as Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit, denied
the petition to vacate a stay of injunction pending appeal of the decision
in Karr v. Schmidt and stated that: "[t]here is no direct, positive command
about local school rules with reference to the length of hair state school
students must have. And I cannot now predict this court will hold that the
more or less vague terms of either the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clause have robbed the States of their traditionally recognized power to
run their school system in accordance with their own best judgment as to
the appropriate length of hair for students. . . .There can, of course, be
honest differences of opinion as to whether any government, state or federal,
should as a matter of public policy regulate the length of haircuts, but It
would be difficult to prove by reason, logic, or common sense that the
federal judiciary is more competent to deal with hair length than are the
local school authorities. . . ." Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201, 1202 (1972).
13. "We are convinced that the United States Constitution and statutes
do not impose on the federal courts the duty and responsibility of super-
vising the length of a student's hair. The problem If It exists, is one for the
states and should be handled through state procedures." Freeman v. Flake,
448 F.2d 258, 259 (10th Cir. 1971).
14. Judge Lay, concurring in Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1078 (8th
Cir. 1971) said:; "[One can be somewhat troubled with the fact that over-
loaded federal dockets are further burdened with cases which center their
controversies on the length of a school boy's hair. It may well seem ap-
propriate that this issue does not Involve a question of substantial constitu-
tional dimension . . . or that such problems should be left to school
authorities. [Citation omitted.] Nevertheless, a state's Invasion into the per-
sonal rights and liberty of an individual, of whatever age or description,
should present a justiciable issue worthy of federal review. There Is little
doubt that this regulation seeks to restrict a young person's personal
liberty to mold his own lifestyle through his personal appearance. To say
that the Issue Is not 'substantial' turns a deaf ear to the basic values of
individual privacy and the freedom to caricature one's own image. Our
institutions do not rely on submerging individual personality in order to
create an 'idealized' citizen."
15. See note 5 supra.
16. Id.
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other hand, the First, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Cir-
cuits"7 hold that hair regulations do implicate, and in some cases
infringe on a constitutionally protected right of students; how-
ever the various analyses differ as to the nature and source
of this right.
Of the different bases presented for the existence of such a
constitutional right, the one most frequently asserted stems from
the first amendment. The issue is whether the length of one's
hair is a form of "symbolic speech" protected by that amend-
ment. "It is argued that the wearing' of long hair is symbolic
speech by which the wearer conveys his individuality, his rejec-
tion of conventional values, and the like."'18 Generally, however,
this argument has been refuted by reliance on Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District,9 wherein the Supreme
Court seemed to distinguish the wearing of long hair from other
more explicit expressions of symbolic speech.2 Some courts feel
that this distinction in Tinker "was intended to delimit the outer
reach of the Court's holding,"21 and, therefore, the first amend-
ment does not guarantee such a right.2 Probably the most prev-
alent view was stated in the First Circuit's conclusion that
while recognizing "that there may be an element of expression
and speech involved in one's choice of hair length and style,
if only the expression of disdain for conventionality, . . .we
reject the notion that . . . hair length is of sufficiently com-
17. Id.
18. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1972).
19. Tinker v. Des Moines, I.S.D., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), involved a regula-
tion which prohibited the wearing of black armbands by students to protest
the Vietnam war. The Supreme Court found that this was a form of "sym-
bolic speech" protected by the first amendment.
20. In T nker, the Court said that "[the problem posed by the present
case does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of
clothing, to hair styles, or deportment. . . Our problem involves direct,
primary First Amendment rights akin to 'pure speech.'" Id. at 507. Bee
also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), wherein another strong
argument for distinguishing the wearing of long hair from symbolic speech
was expressed by the Supreme Court's statement that: "We cannot accept
the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea."
21. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir. 1972).
22. The Tenth Circuit has stated that "[tihe wearing of long hair is not
akin to pure speech. At the most it is symbolic speech indicative of expres-
sions of individuality rather than a contribution to the storehouse of ideas."
Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1971).
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municative character to warrant the full protection of the First
Amendment."2
A second constitutional basis arises from an expansion of
the analyses in Griswold v. Connecticut 4 to include the right
to wear long hair within a constitutionally protected zone of
privacy.25 The "penumbras"26 analysis of Justice Douglas' major-
ity opinion as well as the ninth amendment2 viewpoint of
Justice Goldberg have been advanced in the long hair cases.
However, while recognizing that certain additional rights do
exist aside from those specified in the Bill of Rights, the federal
appellate courts have not placed much emphasis on either of
these approaches, rejecting "the logic of expanding the right of
marital privacy identified in Griswold v. Connecticut . . into
a 'right to go public as one pleases.' "2
"Perhaps the strongest constitutional argument which can
be made on behalf of the students is based on the 'liberty'"
assurance of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." This approach follows the theory that there exist sub-
stantive constitutional rights aside from those specifically set
out in the Bill of Rights.30 These rights are said to be so "funda-
23. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (1st Cir. 1970). (Citations
omitted.)
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. "Much of the present divergence of opinion as to the source of the
right asserted can be traced to the different approaches adopted by the
Justices In Gri.wold. . . . [U]nder any one of them, the conclusion follows
that certain additional rights exist." Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075
(8th Cir. 1971).
26. "[The] specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. [Citations omitted.] Various guarantees create zones of privacy."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
27. The ninth amendment reads, "The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people," but the Third Circuit has concluded that "in the absence
of further guidance from the Supreme Court, we ought not to expand the
Ninth Amendment beyond the notions applied to the right of (martial)
privacy as expressed in Griwo'." Stull v. School Board, 459 F.2d 339, 347
(3d Cir. 1972).
28. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (lst Cir. 1970). [Footnote
omitted.]
29. Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 261 (10th Cir. 1971).
30. "[I]t is clear that the enumeration of certain rights in the Bill of
Rights has not been construed by the Court to preclude the existence of
other substantive rights implicit in the 'liberty' assurance of the Due Process
Clause." Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970).
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mental" as to fall within the "concept of ordered liberty"3 1
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The First Circuit, in adopting this theory,
stated that "'liberty' seems to us an incomplete protection if it
encompasses only the right to do momentous acts, leaving the
state free to interfere with those personal aspects of our lives
which have no direct bearing on the ability of others to enjoy
their liberty. '3 2 The court concluded that "within the commo-
dious concept of liberty, embracing freedoms great and small,
is the right to wear one's hair as he wishes."3 3 The Third Cir-
cuit3 4 has also expressed its confidence that the "liberty" assur-
ance of the fourteenth amendment offers the most convincing
constitutional source for such a right.
While finding that a "fundamental" right to choose one's
hair length does exist, the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits3
have found it unnecessary to specifically state its constitutional
origin. The Seventh Circuit concluded that "whether this right
is designated as within the 'penumbras' of the first amendment
freedom of speech, . . . or as encompassed within the ninth
amendment as an 'additional fundamental right[s] . . . which
exists alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned
in the first eight constitutional amendments,' . . . it clearly
exists and is applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment."36 Using similar reasoning,
the Eighth Circuit stated that "[a] close reading of these cases
reveals . . . that the differences in approach are more semantic
than real. The common theme underlying decisions striking
down hair-style regulations is that the Constitution guarantees
rights other than those specifically enumerated, and that the
right to govern one's personal appearance is one of those guar-
anteed rights."3
Whatever constitutional basis has been advanced for this
31. The fourteenth amendment incorporates those principles "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937).
32. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1970).
33. Id. at 1285.
34. Stull v. School Board, 459 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972).
35. See Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw,
450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
36. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969). [Citations omitted.]
37. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971).
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right, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have denied
that it is of "fundamental" significance. Since "[n]o apparent
consensus exists among the lawyers for the students as to what
constitutional provision affords the protection sought, '8 9 they
conclude that there is no constitutionally protected right to wear
long hair while attending public high school.40
Merely deciding if there does exist such a "fundamental"
right does not end the inquiry into the constitutionality of hair-
length regulations. This determination becomes important be-
cause the characterization of this right weighs heavily on the
evidentiary burden required to satisfy the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
In regard to the burden of proof, it appears that the equal
protection clause has generally not been relied upon to strike
down hair length regulations. However, the Seventh Circuit41
has ruled that such regulations are violative of the equal pro-
tection clause because they are arbitrarily applied only to male
students.42 Those circuits finding no constitutionally protected
right to wear long hair in public high school have generally
followed the Fifth Circuit's ruling that "the classification is
invalid under the Equal Protection clause only if this court can
perceive no rational basis on which it is founded."" Under this
minimum test of equal protection,44 if the stated objectives of
health, safety, and the prevention of disruptions in the educa-
38. See note 5 supra.
39. Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1971).
40. Judge Boreman, dissenting in Ma.sie v. Hi-Jry, 455 F.2d 779, 784 n.1
(4th Cir. 1972), stated: "The general confusion, noted by the majority, as
to precisely which constitutional right, if any, is involved when a student
is prohibited from letting his hair grow to a desired length, perhaps is,
in itself, indicative that there is none. Such confusion surely indicates to
me that a specific constitutional right is not 'directly and sharply' impli-
cated."
41. Crews v. Clonces, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
42. School authorities "admitted that health and safety objectives al-
legedly threatened by students' long hair could be achieved through nar-
rower rules directed specifically at problems created by long hair." They
"offered no reasons why health and safety objectives were not equally
applicable to high school girls" who engaged in "substantially the same
activities" as boys, although "only boys had been required to cut their hair
in order to attend classes." Id. at 1266.
43. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 616 (5th Cir. 1972).
44. The rational basis test is met if, under any possible set of circum-
stances, a constitutionally permissible objective will be accomplished by
reasonable means. Therefore, it becomes a formidable task for a challenger
to prove there is no rational basis for a given regulation.
19731
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tional process are shown to be rationally related to the hair
regulations, then such regulations will be upheld.
Considering the due process clause, those circuits finding no
"fundamental" right involved in these cases take a position
similar to the Fifth Circuit's that "the appropriate standard of
review is simply one of whether the regulation is reasonably
intended to accomplish a constitutionally permissible stated
objective" leaving the "challenger to show that the restriction
is wholly arbitrary. '45 This seems to be in line with the Supreme
Court's statement that "[l]iberty under the Constitution is neces-
sarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in
the interests of the community is due process.
'46
In those cases in which a "fundamental" right is implicated,
the requirements of due process and equal protection are not
so easily satisfied. The Supreme Court recently stated that in
such a case "the statutory classifications would have to be, not
merely rationally related to a valid public purpose, but neces-
sary to the achievement of a compelling state interest. '47 This
higher test seems to overlap both the equal protection and due
process clauses and involves a more stringent burden of proof.
In the hair length cases, this entails a weighing process by the
court to balance the interests of the state in its educational
process against the student's right to personal liberty, i.e., the
right to govern the length of his hair. Looking to the Supreme
Court for guidance, one finds the Court stating in Tinker that
"it can hardly be argued either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate....
In our system, State operated schools may not be enclaves
of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute
authority over their students. Students in school as well as
out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are
possessed of fundamental rights which the state must respect,
45. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 616 (5th Cir. 1972).
46. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
47. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 1035 (1972). See also, Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960), in which the Supreme Court emphasized that
"where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the state
may prevail only upon showing a subordinating Interest which is com-
pelling."
[Vol. 33
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just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the
State."8
Therefore, to justify infringement of student rights, school offi-
cials bear a heavy procedural burden. To demonstrate a "com-
pelling interest" they must do more than declare the necessity
of a hair length regulation. Tinker explains that "undifferenti-
ated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough" 49 to
overcome "fundamental" rights. 50 School boards would have to
show that long hair would "materially and substantially inter-
fere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.""' Thus, the First, Third, Fourth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits5 2 have held hair regulations in-
valid, finding no compelling state interest5 to justify the intru-
sion on students' personal liberties.54 Finding that the school
board failed to meet its burden of proof, the Eighth Circuit
stated that "the connection between long hair and the im-
memorial problems of misdirected student activism and nega-
tivism, whether in behavior or in learning, is difficult to see.
No evidence has been presented that hair is a cause, as dis-
tinguished from a possible peripheral consequence, of undesir-
48. Tinker v. Des Moines I.S.D., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07, 511 (1969).
49. Id. at 508.
50. Those circuits finding that there is a "fundamental" right to wear
long hair recognized that personal freedoms are not absolute. However,
they have found that "to limit or curtail this or any other fundamental
right, the state has a 'substantial burden of justification.'" Breen v. Kahl,
419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969).
51. Id. at 509. This language was taken from the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). A school regulation for-
bade students to wear "freedom buttons," and the Fifth Circuit held the
regulation to be invalid since there was no actual disturbance other than a
"mild curiosity" on the part of the students. However, on the same day
the court decided Blackwell v. Issaquena County BRd. of Educ., 363 F.2d
749 (5th Cir. 1966), wherein such a regulation was held invalid because the
school officials demonstrated that the commotion was tied to "wearing, dis-
tributing, discussing and promoting the wearing" of the buttons. In the
latter case, the court presumably found that such expression did "materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school."
52. See note 5 supra.
53. "A school rule which forbids skirts shorter than a certain length
while on school grounds would require less justification than one requiring
hair to be cut, which affects the student twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week, nine months a year." Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1285
(1st Cir. 1970).
54. "Since the impact of hair regulation extends beyond the schoolhouse
gate, the degree of state infringement on personal rights is significantly
greater than in many areas of school discipline." Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d
1259, 1264 (7th Cir. 1969).
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able traits, or that the school board, Delilah-like, can lop off
these characteristics with the locks.
55
If school authorities can produce evidence demonstrating a
connection between long hair and "actual disruptions" in the
education process, this may well be considered a "compelling
interest." However, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that even if
disruptions are shown, long-haired students should be protected
"unless school officials have actively tried and failed to silence
those persons actually engaged in disruptive conduct."50 In those
circuits finding a "fundamental" right to wear long hair, the
requirements of due process and equal protection have yet to
be met.57
Until the Supreme Court settles this issue, one may only
speculate as to whether there exists a constitutionally protected
right to wear long hair while attending public high school.
There is strong interest in relieving the federal courts of the
burden of this litigation and leaving such matters to the local
school boards. At the same time, there is an equal desire to
protect the personal liberty of students to govern their own
personal appearance. At present, five circuits58 have held that an
individual does have such a "fundamental" right to govern his
personal appearance, 59 which necessarily includes the right to
wear one's hair at the length he chooses. Four other circuits
have concluded that no such right exists.2
In evaluating the bases set forth for such a constitutional
guarantee, one cannot say that a student's contention that such
a right arises from the first amendment's protection of "symbolic
speech" is without merit. While many students may wear their
hair merely to keep abreast of current hairstyles, one must
recognize that others undoubtedly intend long hair to be an
expression of their ideas as well as their individuality. Thus
far, however, the federal circuits have been reluctant to follow
55. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1971).
56. Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d 1259, 1265 (7th Cir. 1969).
57. See note 5 supra.
58. Id.
59. "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
60. See note 5 supra.
[Vol. 33
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this view in light of the limiting language in Tinker as well as
the fact that most students have not asserted such intentions
in their petitions. Likewise, the courts have failed to give any
effect to the "forgotten" ninth amendment or to place much
emphasis on the "penumbras" analysis with its various zones
of privacy. To find the existence of such a "fundamental" right,
the proper analysis, and surely the most consistent one, seems
to lie in the traditional theory of substantive due process. Utiliz-
ing this approach it is submitted that the "liberty" concept of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides
the source of a "fundamental" right to wear one's hair in the
length he chooses, even while attending public high school.
Recognizing that such a right is not absolute, public high school
authorities must demonstrate that hair regulations further a
"compelling interest"'1 since they infringe the personal liberties
of the students and invade into their private lives as their
effect extends beyond the schoolhouse gate. Few school boards
can meet this burden of proof. Thus, denying a person the benefit
of a public education because of the length of his hair becomes
an arbitrary discrimination violative of the equal protection
2
and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 63
Tim Allen
61. "[W]hat is disturbing is the inescapable feeling that long hair is
simply not a source of significant distraction, and that school officials are
often acting on the basis of personal distaste amplified by an overzealous
belief in the needs for regulation." Comment, 84 HARv. L. Rzv. 1702, 1715
(1971).
62. "It comes as a surprise that in a country where the States are
restrained by an Equal Protection Clause, a person can be denied an educa-
tion in a public school because of the length of his hair." Ferrell v. Dallas
I.S.D., 393 U.S. 856 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also the specially
concurring opinion of Judge Tuttle in Sherling v. Townley, 464 F.2d 587,
588 (5th Cir. 1972). He takes the position that the issue is not whether one
has a constitutionally protected right to wear long hair, but whether
a local school board has the right "to deny to such a boy what has become
a fundamental right of every American child-a . . . high school education
at public expense." Although he concurs in this per curiam due to the Fifth
Circuit's en bane decision in Karr, Judge Tuttle states that had he been an
active member of the court he would have joined the dissent in Karr and
"would favor the court having adopted a per se rule that no such regula-
tion can stand under the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the ground that such regulations create a classification of
citizens totally unrelated to the obectives of the operation of high schools."
63. Although this Note deals with hair regulations in the public high
schools, it is appropriate to mention the recent Fifth Circuit decision in
Lansdale v. Tyler Jr. College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972). While purportedly
reaffirming their earlier decision In Karr, the court found that "in the
absence of a showing that unusual conditions exist, the regulation of the
